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ABSTRACT
The social division of welfare literature emphasises the extent to which occu-
pational-pension provision is distributed on the basis of class and gender. As
most previous commentators have at least implicitly recognised, however, a
signiﬁcant proportion of less advantaged people are covered. This paper
argues that the patterns of access and their distributional consequences must
be considered more systematically, and that in this context, the diversity of
employers’ pension schemes are investigated. When this is done, it emerges
that in the United Kingdom, the spread of occupational provision beyond the
most privileged workers means that some vulnerable individuals avoid poverty
in retirement. At the same time, however, the main determinant of which less
advantaged people are covered and which not is chance. While class and
gender are important predictors of who receives occupational pensions, access
for the disadvantaged arises mainly as an accident of an employment decision
made for reasons unrelated to savings or pensions criteria. This paper argues
that the implication is that unsustainable justice-based arguments are currently
used by policy makers to sanction the current distribution of UK pension
incomes. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the ﬁndings
for the appropriateness of recent UK policy proposals and for international
debates about pension reform.
KEY WORDS – social, division, welfare, occupational, pensions, justice,
Titmuss, chance.
Introduction
The distributive consequences of occupational pensions have been
a matter of concern for British social policy analysts since Richard
Titmuss’s seminal essays during the 1950s on the social division of
welfare and pensions.1 Titmuss emphasised the importance of ﬁscal and
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occupational welfare in the analysis of social policy, and on this basis
famously warned that :
The direction in which the forces of social and ﬁscal policy were moving raised
fundamental issues of justice and equality.… Already it is possible to see two
nations in old age; greater inequalities in living standards after work than
in work; two contrasting social services for distinct groups based on diﬀerent
principles, and operating in isolation of each other as separate, autonomous,
social instruments of change (Titmuss 1958: 74).
The nation, according to Titmuss, was split in 1958 between the 35 per
cent of privileged workers who had access to occupational pensions
and those who did not and who therefore faced a greater risk of old-age
poverty (Lynes 1997: 323). Despite this warning, Titmuss’s preferred policy
solution to these social divisions – a substantial increase in universal state
provision – was largely ignored.
In 1975, the Labour government introduced State Earnings-Related
Pensions (SERPS), but they were signiﬁcantly less extensive than those
proposed in 1957 by the Labour Party in National Superannuation, which
Titmuss helped to draft (Baldwin 1990; Fawcett 1996), and SERPS
implied acceptance of a continuing role for occupational pensions. Those
who contributed to such pensions were allowed to ‘contract-out ’ of the
new SERPS scheme if their scheme passed various tests of quality (Income
Data Services (IDS) 2003). Moreover, SERPS was retrenched in the 1980s
and has since been replaced by the State Second Pension, which over the
next two decades will develop into a ﬂat-rate pension. Replacement rates
from state provision in the UK have thus been signiﬁcantly lower than in
most continental European countries and the United States of America
(Pensions Commission 2004: 58). This makes occupational pensions a
vital element in the UK old-age income system, but while coverage of
occupational pensions increased up to the mid-1960s, it has remained
fairly static at around 50 per cent of the workforce ever since (Lynes 1997:
323). As a result, inequalities in pension income similar to those that
Titmuss observed in the 1950s remain a signiﬁcant feature of the UK
pension system (Goodman, Johnson and Webb 1997: 104; Joseph
Rowntree Foundation 1995: 26–7; see also Pensions Commission 2004:
69; Lynes 1997; Waine 1995; Walker 1999).
Against this background, the British literature on the social division of
welfare in old age has understandably continued to focus on those without
occupational pension provision, and emphasised the ways in which social
class and gender inﬂuence on which side of the ‘have, have-not ’ divide a
worker falls (Arber 1989; Ginn 2003; Ginn and Arber 1991, 1993; Sinﬁeld
1978). With regard to gender, feminists have emphasised the extent to
which women are disproportionately represented among the ‘poorer
354 Traute Meyer and Paul Bridgen
nations’ in retirement, because job discrimination and the gendered
division of caring means that they disproportionately lose by an occu-
pationally-based welfare system (Ginn 2003). Regarding social class, vari-
ous indicators of social stratiﬁcation (e.g. occupation and income) have
been used to show the particularly disadvantaged position of manual and
semi-skilled workers (Ginn and Arber 1991).
As most commentators in the ﬁeld have at least implicitly recognised,
the social division of post-retirement income has always been more com-
plicated and arbitrary than implied by the notion of ‘ two nations ’ divided
by either or both class or gender (Titmuss 1958; Ginn and Arber 1999).
While occupational provision has always been most common among
professionals, and has thereby contributed to class divisions in retirement,
a signiﬁcant minority of non-professionals have also been covered – and
still are ; ‘ two nations’ in retirement is not and never has been entirely
synonymous with class or gender divisions in work. Recent research by the
Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS) concluded that ‘whilst it is generally true
that higher-income individuals have higher levels of pension wealth, there
is still great inequality in wealth even amongst those with similar current
incomes’ (Banks et al. 2005: 22). For example, a substantial proportion
(>25%) of those in the ﬁfth and sixth highest income deciles of the IFS
sample had more pension wealth than those in the seventh decile.
The aim of the study reported in this paper was to investigate the
distribution of pension entitlements in the UK population, with particular
attention to the implications for those with low to middling lifetime
earnings (i.e. wages below the average but above the poverty line). To be
clear, the study does not refute the importance of social class, care-
responsibilities and gender-based job discrimination in conditioning
pension outcomes. The authors agree with the ﬁndings of studies of the
social division of welfare that these factors are associated with exclusion
from occupational pensions and thus with the likelihood that an individual
will suﬀer poverty after retirement, as concluded by the Pensions
Commission (2004: 68–9). In other words, individuals who have received
below-average lifetime incomes suﬀer a higher risk of exclusion from
occupational schemes than those on higher wages.
Despite these associations, the fact that a substantial fraction of the high-
risk groups have access to occupational schemes has implications for the
overall distribution of pension income, and for the UK system’s perform-
ance in combating poverty and social exclusion. It is argued in this paper
that while the spread of occupational provision beyond the most
privileged workers results in some vulnerable individuals avoiding old-age
poverty, the main determinant of who among this group escapes and who
does not is chance: the result of accidents of opportunity rather than
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planning or intention. As such it cannot be normatively justiﬁed on the
basis of the desert-based conception of justice favoured by recent policy
makers.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, the distribution of
occupational pensions by employment sector is reviewed, to show the
variability in the likelihood of employees being contributors to such
schemes. The following section presents a micro-simulation of pension
entitlements for the seven standard UK socio-economic classes (SEC), as
well as for highly qualiﬁed women with a care-related employment gap
(Oﬃce of National Statistics 2006).2 The simulation illustrates the mark-
edly variable outcomes of diﬀerent types of pension schemes. These
outcomes will be compared to those of identical biographies in two
other countries, The Netherlands and Switzerland.3 In these countries,
occupational provision is more compulsory, either as a result of collective
bargaining backed by the state, as in The Netherlands (Bannink 2005;
Anderson 2004), or as a result of legislation, as in Switzerland (Bonoli 2000;
Queisser and Vittas 2000; Queisser and Whitehouse 2003). The com-
parison emphasises the generosity of the British system for those who have
occupational provision, but also shows its variable incidence and eﬀects.
The paper then discusses the implications of these results for the policies
that combat poverty and social exclusion in the UK, and justiﬁes the em-
phasis on chance as the allocating mechanism. In the ﬁnal section, the
implications of the ﬁndings for the current international pensions’ policy
debate will be discussed, as well as recent UK pensions policy proposals.
Access to occupational provision
In the United Kingdom, employers have had considerable freedom to
decide whether or not to oﬀer pension schemes and to determine the types
that they make available (Bridgen and Meyer 2005a). Pension beneﬁts and
conditions of access have varied widely as a result. Social policy analysts
have given most attention to the social and gender biases of this coverage.
Ginn and Arber (1999) showed that just under 80 per cent of men in
SEC I were paying occupational pension contributions in 1993/94, but
only about 40 per cent of those in SEC VI (Pensions Commission 2004:
97) ; and that while 61 per cent of all men paid occupational pension
contributions, only 42 per cent of women did so. Access to occupational
schemes is not however totally blocked for workers with low qualiﬁcations
or with care responsibilities. The coverage is broader and less diﬀer-
entiated by gender and occupational category (or SEC) in some employ-
ment sectors than others. Pension schemes in the better-covered sectors
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may not have been designed with low-skilled or part-time workers in
mind, but they are all-encompassing.
The most comprehensive coverage is achieved in the public sector and
by large private-sector companies. In the public sector in 2000, only
about 16 per cent of employees were not covered (Pensions Commission
2004: 93). In companies with more than 250 employees, 55 per cent had
access to an occupational pension, but in ﬁrms with 1–49 employees,
only 19 per cent did so. In the private sector some types of economic
activity are better covered than others ; in manufacturing almost 60 per
cent of employees are covered; in wholesale and retail the coverage is
40 per cent ; and in hotels and restaurants it is about 12 per cent (Pensions
Commission 2004: 64). Although access to occupational pensions for
workers at risk of low income in old age is therefore possible, the beneﬁts
vary widely and are dependent on the employer. The most generous
pensions, ‘deﬁned-beneﬁt (DB) schemes’, are disproportionately found in
the public sector and are the only type of scheme that it had oﬀered
(Government Actuary’s Department 2003: 9). In the private sector the
generally less generous money purchase and hybrid schemes are more
common, although DB schemes continue to predominate, particularly
among older workers. The latter have been advantaged by the fact that
when employers have closed DB schemes, this has generally been only to
new contributors and existing members’ entitlements have not changed
(Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) 2004: 58; Pensions
Commission 2004: 118; Bridgen and Meyer 2005a). Nevertheless,
deﬁned-contributions (DC) pensions can be advantageous to someworkers,
particularly the most mobile, given the generally inadequate arrange-
ments in the UK for preserving the value of DB pensions left behind by
workers when changing employer (Blake 2000).
The distributive consequences: risk biographies and
micro-simulation
One way of illustrating the distributive consequences of today’s UK
pension regime and the eﬀect of the outlined variations by employment
sector on employees’ pension outcomes is by micro-simulation of its eﬀects
on a range of constructed biographies. This allows an assessment of
the future impact of today’s pension policies for various characteristic
occupational biographies and illustrates the interaction between regime
features and a person’s employment history. As Johnson and Rake (1998)
suggested, comparative work makes it possible for researchers to bridge
the diﬀerences in national socio-economic backgrounds and to focus
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purely on the impact of the pensions regime on individuals. Thus, micro-
simulation is a two-stage process in which, ﬁrst, a group of exemplar life
biographies are constructed, and secondly, the entitlements to pensions of
these individuals on retirement are calculated.
With regard to the ﬁrst stage, as explained in the introduction, our
concern is with individuals with lower qualiﬁcations, i.e. who are in
semi-routine or routine occupations (SEC IV–VII), or who experience
care-related employment gaps and part-time work. These factors mean
that their lifetime earnings are below average. Within this group, in-
dividuals experience diﬀerent life course and employment trajectories that
inﬂuence their ﬁnal pension entitlement. To reﬂect this diversity, we have
made the exemplar biographies as non-schematic as possible. In other
words, the imagined lifecourse trajectories are not deﬁned solely by the
level of earnings (see for example Pensions Commission 2004;
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 2005), but
also include various social risks that are likely to aﬀect the pension
outcome (e.g. part-time work, periods of caring and early retirement), and
they reﬂect broad social and economic trends in post-industrial societies
(Armingeon and Bonoli 2006; Castles 2003; Hantrais 1999; Pierson 2001).
Five exemplar ‘risk biographies ’ were constructed. All ﬁve were aged
18 years in 2003, and will reach 65 years-of-age on 1 January 2050. The
details are :
Biography 1. Tessa : an unqualiﬁed part-time worker and mother
Tessa is employed as a semi-routine retail salesperson (SEC VI) throughout
her working life. Her earnings oscillate over and under 50 per cent of average
full-time wages, falling to a low of 30 per cent of average wages when she returns
to work after the birth of her second child, and rising to a high of 62 per cent of
average wages in the ﬁnal years of her working life. She is out of the workforce
for ﬁve years when aged 23 to 29 years when caring for her children and,
on returning to work, is on a part-time contract for 10 of the 35 years up to
retirement.
Biography 2. Margaret : a qualiﬁed part-time worker and mother
Margaret gains a nursing qualiﬁcation (SEC III). Her earnings oscillate over
and under 60 per cent of the average full-time wage, rising to a high of 70 per
cent of average wages in the years immediately before her marriage, and falling
to a low of 38 per cent of average wages when she returns to work after the
birth of her second child. Between the ages of 25 and 32 years, she spends four
years out of the workforce caring for her children and another ﬁve years from
the age of 60 years caring for an elderly relative. She is on a part-time contract
from the age of 32 years, when she returns to work after childcare, until
retirement.
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Biography 3. Tony : an unqualiﬁed male worker
Tony worked in the motor industry as a semi-routine technical worker (SEC VI).
His earnings rise steadily from a starting level of 65 per cent of average wages in
2003, to a high of 85 per cent when aged from his late thirties to late ﬁfties,
dipping thereafter to 80 per cent for the rest of his working life. He is unemployed
for a year at the age of 26 years when between employers.
Biography 4. Gordon : an intermittent male worker
Gordon is a qualiﬁed manual worker (SEC V) who is employed in the
construction sector from the age of 20 years. He consistently earns around the
average full-time wage when in work, his highest wage of 140 per cent of average
wages being achieved in the ﬁnal year of his working life. His lowest wage, at 80
per cent of the average, is accrued when he starts employment and in his ﬁrst year
of self-employment at age 37 years. He is self-employed from this age until re-
tirement at 65. He experiences four years out of the labour force between the ages
of 27 and 37 years through unemployment and re-training.
Biography 5. David : a male small-business entrepreneur
David worked in the family business (SEC IV) until the age of 30 years,
apart from one year in full-time training, and earned 50 to 75 per cent of the
full-time average wage. He took over the business at the age of 30 years, after
which his income oscillated above and below the average full-time wage, with a
high of 110 per cent of average wages between the ages of 39 and 44 years.
It is relatively straightforward to calculate the future state-pension
entitlements of these biographies given various assumptions, as set out in
Table 1.4 The current state-pension formulae establish future entitlements
on the basis of a projection of the working life (i.e. wages and contri-
butions) of the biographies under various reasonable assumptions (detailed
in Table 1). Assessing the projected level of non-state provision is less
common in micro-simulation, because it raises several methodological
problems, particularly for the UK (Meyer et al. 2007). Decisions have to be
made about the occupational entitlements of each risk biography, which
raises questions about their prevalence and value. In some other
European countries, such projections are less problematic, either because
the scale and importance of occupational provision is not as great (until
recently this was true for Germany), or because compulsion makes
the coverage of occupational pensions greater and more uniform
(e.g. Switzerland and The Netherlands).5 In the UK, greater employer
voluntarism means that coverage is patchier and variable, so predictions
of the likely occupational coverage of individual biographies are not
straightforward.
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Given the current pattern of UK occupational pension coverage, one
approach might be to assume that employees with the described bio-
graphies are altogether excluded from occupational provision. Certainly
they are generally less likely to have occupational provision than other
types of worker but, we reiterate, exclusion from access is not total : all
of the exemplar biographies could have some access to occupational
provision for periods of if not the whole of their working life. This is more
likely for some than others ; for example, the nurse is highly likely to have
worked in the public sector, and therefore almost certain to have a DB
pension. Likewise, the car worker’s prospect of an occupational pension is
much higher than the construction worker’s, particularly given that the
latter was self-employed for much of his working life. If he does have
access, the pension scheme could be either DB or DC. The shop-worker’s
chances of having an occupational pension are lower. If she does, it is
likely to be DC, although some of the larger retailers provide DB pensions.
Whether or not each of the biographies fall into the sub-group of em-
ployees in their sector that are covered is most inﬂuenced by the size of the
employing ﬁrm.
When estimating overall pension entitlements, there is little justiﬁcation
for simplifying this complex pattern of provision. Thus, rather than mak-
ing a single assumption about each biography’s access to occupational
provision, we have examined variant employment histories. For example,
the retail company for whom the unqualiﬁed part-time worker and
mother works was varied. For the nurse, the variants are : (a) employed in
the National Health Service (NHS) throughout, and (b) employed for the
T A B L E 1. Assumptions in the simulations
Assumption Details
Average wages National Statistics New Earnings Survey.
Starting age of biographies 18 years in 2003.
Employment careers January 2003–December 2049.
Annual rate of inﬂation 1.9%, based on UK government assumption (Cm 5677, 2002)
and EU assumption (www.ecb.int/mopo/html/index.en.html).
Annual rate of earnings growth Two per cent above inﬂation (DWP 2002: 159).
State pension system Rules and stipulations of public pension regime as valid in 2004
(Income Data Services 2003).
Occupational pension scheme
stipulations
Income Data Services (2002).
Period of saving All years of working life.
Scale of saving Same proportion of earnings during every year of saving
(Pensions Commission 2004: 150–6).
Rate of return 3.9% real (including charges) ; 5% annuity rate on retirement;
annuity rate in line with situation in 2004 (see
sharingpensions.co.uk).
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last 20 years of her working life by a small welfare charity. Finally, while all
the biographies of unqualiﬁed male workers involved employment in
the motor industry, one is employed by Rover and then Vauxhall, one
by Nissan and Peugeot, and one throughout his working life by a small
car-component manufacturer. The pension entitlements of all biographies
and their variant employers have been examined in relation to the pro-
jected old-age poverty (i.e. dependency on social assistance) and social
exclusion outcomes (the latter deﬁned as a pension that is less than 40 per
cent of average wages) (Table 2).6 Comparisons are also made with the
pensions and income outcomes in old age of similar working lives in The
Netherlands and Switzerland.
The United Kingdom pension system and social risks
The exemplar biographies and contrasting employment histories clearly
reveal considerable variability in the pension outcomes and several com-
plexities in the social division of occupational welfare. Some variants
lead to a pension close to or above the social inclusion threshold, showing
that neither a life on low wages nor an employment trajectory with
several breaks or periods of part-time work inevitably leads to poverty in
T A B L E 2. Projected state, occupational and total pension income in 2050 as a
percentage of the social inclusion threshold by risk biography and employer history
Occupational biography and employers
State
pension
Occupational
pension
Total
pension
Percentage of
Tessa
Corner shop employment 47 0 47
Boots the Chemist retail stores 33 35 68
Tesco PLC, retail stores 33 58 91
Tony
Component supplier 57 0 57
Peugeot then Nissan 20 58 78
Ford then Vauxhall 20 132 152
Margaret
National Health Service (NHS) 30 65 95
NHS and small private-sector employer 46 12 58
Gordon
Construction industry, then self-employed 20 23 43
David
Small family business and self-employed 27 0 27
Note : The social inclusion threshold is deﬁned as an annual income that is less than 40 per cent of
average wages.
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retirement, even if both occur. Some individuals and couples are therefore
luckier than others with regard to occupational pensions ; they obtain post-
retirement incomes that compare favourably with those received by simi-
lar workers in Switzerland and The Netherlands, but the low level of UK
state provision greatly exaggerates the cost of being a loser.
The variable outcomes are shown by the individual biographies. Let us
start with Tessa, the unqualiﬁed worker and mother. She is employed in
the retail sector throughout her working life, quite probably always for
small, independent shop-keepers that do not provide occupational pro-
vision (Pensions Commission 2004: 64). It is also possible, however, that
she works for employers that oﬀer either DB or DC pensions. If, for
example, she works for Tesco PLC, the UK’s leading supermarket chain,
she would receive an average-salary DB pension, but if she worked for
Boots Group PLC (now Alliance Boots PLC), the UK’s leading pharma-
ceutical and toiletries retailer, she would receive a DC pension in addition
to the state pension (Incomes Data Services 2002). Her choice of employer
is highly unlikely to have been inﬂuenced by the pension schemes that they
oﬀer. With regard to contributions, if she works for a corner-shop, she
would pay National Insurance contributions of 11 per cent of gross in-
come, whereas if she works for Boots, she would have to pay a reduced
contracted-out National Insurance contribution of 9.4 per cent and an
employee’s contribution of three per cent to the occupational pension
scheme, making total contributions of 12.4 per cent.7 If she works for
Tesco’s, her total contributions would be 13.4 per cent, made up of the
same National Insurance contribution as the Boots’ worker and a four per
cent occupational-pension contribution.
As can be seen from Table 2, the implications of this variation in
pension provision for the income in retirement of the unqualiﬁed worker
and mother are substantial. In comparison with a similar person who
worked for smaller retail outlets without occupational pensions, women
employed by Boots and Tesco’s are signiﬁcantly advantaged in terms of
pension income. Whereas the pension income of the Tesco’s worker on
retirement is 91 per cent of the social inclusion threshold, and the Boot’s
worker’s pension achieves 68 per cent of this threshold, the corner-shop
employee is reliant on the state provision with a value of only 47 per cent of
the social inclusion threshold. The corner-shop employee could, of course,
save privately to boost her retirement income. Her total contributions
are lower than those of her Boots and Tesco’s peers, so there might be
scope for this. Calculations based on the assumptions speciﬁed in Table 1
suggest that she would have to save ﬁve per cent of her gross yearly income
to reach the pension level of the Boots worker, and eight per cent to reach
that of the Tesco’s worker. Thus, she would have to pay 16 per cent of her
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income in savings and National Insurance contributions to receive the
same pension as the Boot’s worker will receive for 12.4 per cent of her
income, and 19 per cent of her income to receive the same pension as the
Tesco’s worker gets for 13.4 per cent. She has to pay more herself to make
up for the fact that, unlike her counterparts employed in bigger ﬁrms, she
does not beneﬁt from an employer contribution to her non-state pension
scheme. Indeed, as can be can be seen from Figure 1, the Tesco’s em-
ployee’s occupational pension is more valuable in relation to the UK social
exclusion line than the occupational pensions received by a similar retail
employee in The Netherlands or Switzerland. It is only because the size of
state provision is higher in these countries that the equivalent occupational
history leads to a greater pension in relation to national social exclusion
thresholds.
Others are even bigger winners in terms of occupational pensions,
particularly those who are employed for most of their working life by large
manufacturing companies or in the public sector, where DB pensions re-
main common. Take, for example, Tony, the unqualiﬁed male worker: he
is employed in the motor industry, earns no more than 80 per cent of the
average wage throughout his working life, and experiences one year of
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unemployment. Such a person might work in a small ﬁrm that supplies
components to the major motor manufacturers, or alternatively be
employed by just such a ﬁrm. If he spent his working life employed
successively by Peugeot and Nissan, he would receive a DC pension in
addition to his state pension on retirement, whereas if he worked succes-
sively for Rover and Vauxhall, he would receive two DB pensions. Once
again, it is highly unlikely that his choice of employer would be inﬂuenced
by the type of occupational pension, if any, that they provide. With regard
to contributions, if Tony worked for the component supplier he would
have to pay National Insurance contributions of 11 per cent of gross
income, whereas if he worked for Nissan and Peugeot he would have to
pay reduced National Insurance contributions of 9.4 per cent and an
employee’s contribution to the occupational pension of between three and
ﬁve per cent, making total contributions of between 12.4 and 14.4 per cent.
In the simulations it was assumed that he paid total contributions of 12.8
per cent.8 If he worked for Ford and Vauxhall his total contributions
would be 17.4 per cent, made up of the contracted-out National Insurance
contribution of 9.4 per cent and an eight per cent occupational-pension
contribution.
As Table 2 shows, the diﬀerent employers substantially aﬀect Tony’s
retirement income. In this regard, the Rover and Vauxhall employee does
very well, for these companies provide the very best of UK occupational
pensions, which yield an income substantially above the social inclusion
threshold. Working for these companies, Tony’s total old-age income is
152 per cent of the threshold. In fact, seen comparatively, the Rover and
Vauxhall employee receives a signiﬁcantly higher pension income than
that achieved by similar workers in either The Netherlands or
Switzerland, even though the UK state pension is much lower (Figure 2).
In comparison with an occupational pension for the British worker of 132
per cent of the British social exclusion threshold, the Dutch worker re-
ceives an occupational pension that is 78 per cent of The Netherlands’
social exclusion threshold, and the Swiss worker a pension that is 41 per
cent of the Swiss equivalent.
An employee with a DC pension is advantaged in comparison with a
component-ﬁrm employee but is not as fortunate as the Ford and
Vauxhall worker: he secures an income on retirement substantially above
social assistance on retirement but 22 percentage points below the social
inclusion threshold. On the other hand, a small-ﬁrm employee is a serious
loser. While he would clear the poverty threshold on retirement, he would
not receive an income that allows participation in even the most custom-
ary out-of-home activities in contemporary Britain. He would have to save
three per cent of his gross yearly income to reach the income of the Nissan
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and Peugeot worker, and 13 per cent to reach that of the Ford and Rover
worker. Thus, he would have to pay 14 per cent of his income (in savings
and National Insurance) to receive the same pension as the Nissan and
Peugeot worker receives by paying 13.4 per cent of his income, and 24 per
cent of his income to receive the same pension as the Ford and Rover
worker receives by paying 14.4 per cent. This again illustrates the im-
portant advantages gained by those workers whose employers contribute
to their non-state provision.
As noted earlier, the other big winners in the UK system are public-
sector workers, as revealed by the circumstances of the qualiﬁed part-time
nurse and mother, Margaret (Table 2). She is a trained nurse with earn-
ings that oscillate between 40 per cent and 80 per cent of average wages.
She experiences occasional periods out of the workforce, including early
retirement, and works part time for long periods. In the simulations, we
assumed that one variant of Margaret is employed throughout her work-
ing life in the NHS, and thus gains access to a good quality DB pension,
while another works after 40 years-of-age for a small private welfare or-
ganisation that does not provide an occupational pension. With regard to
contributions, NHS Margaret would have to pay total contributions of
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15.4 per cent of gross wages throughout her working life, made up of a
9.4 per cent contracted-out National Insurance contribution and a six
per cent NHS contribution. Her colleague who leaves the NHS would
only have to pay this amount during her time with the organisation;
afterwards she would only have to pay National Insurance of 11 per cent.
As a result, NHS Margaret’s pension is 37 percentage points higher as a
proportion of the social inclusion threshold than that of her colleague who
leaves the NHS. The latter would have to save 12 per cent of her gross
income over her entire working life to receive the same pension as NHS
Margaret. Thus, her total contributions while working for the NHS would
amount to 27.4 per cent of gross income, a ﬁgure that would decline to 23
per cent when she no longer had to pay the NHS pension contribution. In
comparison, NHSMargaret draws amuch higher pension for 15.4 per cent.
The employees who are most disadvantaged by the distribution of UK
occupational pensions are those who work for small private-sector ﬁrms or
for themselves. Gordon, the intermittent worker, and David, the self-
employed entrepreneur, illustrate the problems that these workers face.
Gordon is a construction worker and receives lifetime wages just above
and below 90 per cent of the average wage (so is paid more than Tony, the
unqualiﬁed worker). Gordon works in a small business for the ﬁrst 13 years
of his working life and is then self-employed until retirement. David, the-
self-employed entrepreneur, also earns more than Tony and close to the
average wage for long periods, but is self-employed for longer – 35 years of
his working life. Gordon has access to an employer-supported stakeholder
pension while he is employed by someone else, into which he pays 2.4 per
cent of his gross income. Thus his total contributions including National
Insurance during this time are 11.8 per cent of gross income, but sub-
stantially less when he is self-employed, for then he pays a nominal ﬂat-
rate contribution of less than one per cent of average wages. David has no
occupational provision and thus only pays the self-employed rate
throughout his working life. As can be seen in Table 2, these working
biographies signiﬁcantly aﬀect the income of these individuals on retire-
ment : the pension received by Gordon is 43 per cent of the social inclusion
threshold, while for David it is 27 per cent, even though both these workers
earnmore than the unqualiﬁedworker,Tony,whose access to goodoccupa-
tional provision ensures that he will beneﬁt from a much better income in
retirement.
Given that both Gordon and David receive reasonably good
wages and pay much lower National Insurance contributions while
self-employed, it might be argued that they can aﬀord to save the seven per
cent (intermittent worker) and nine per cent (self-employed entrepreneur)
of gross earnings that our calculations suggest would be required to raise
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their retirement income above the social inclusion threshold. However,
many self-employed people do not save because they regard their business
as their pension. Only approximately 43 per cent of self-employed men
and 35 per cent of self-employed women made any contributions to a
private pension scheme in 2002/03 (Pensions Commission 2004: 91).
For this reason, although the intermittent worker and the self-employed
entrepreneur earn more than the unskilled worker, they are disadvantaged
by the current distribution of British occupational pensions. In summary,
the examples reveal the complicating eﬀect of non-professional workers’
access to occupational pensions on the social division of pension income in
the UK. Although all the imagined individuals are disadvantaged by class
or gender, some achieve incomes in retirement close to or above the social
inclusion threshold. The biographies show well that a signiﬁcant minority
of non-core male and female workers with access to good occupational
pension schemes do better than their class or gender peers in terms of
pension income.
Couples and occupational pensions
So far we have considered the outcomes of the UK pension system only
for individuals, which is consistent with the tendency in social policy away
from seeing the household as the unit of relative material welfare towards
individual assessment, as endorsed in forceful political statements by the
European Union and the British government (Council of European Union
2003; DWP 2002). Pension systems based on an assumption of ﬁnancial
dependence between partners are problematic given the evidence that the
‘breadwinner’ does not always distribute ‘his ’ resources equally (Graham
1987; Pahl 1989). Nevertheless, if we are to gain a full appreciation of the
distributive consequences of occupational pensions, it is important to
consider the possibility that access to occupational-pension income might
also occur through marriage. In this regard, the biographies illustrate
changes in the gendered division of pension income among married
couples and the very diﬀerent old-age income outcomes for those on low
and middle incomes.
Through much of the 20th century, it was assumed that the male
‘breadwinner’ model of marital income was accompanied by reasonable
sharing of the pension income. It followed that if a woman was dis-
advantaged or had low lifetime income, this would be mitigated by mar-
riage (Ginn 2003). The model entrenched the gendered division of pension
income, with married women without occupational provision of their own
becoming dependent on their husband’s income for a retirement above
the poverty line. Today, however, the experience of workers such as NHS
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Margaret suggest that this situation could be changing. The growth of
women’s employment – much of it with public-sector employers that
provide DB pensions – together with the decline of DB provision in the
private sector (see below), has over the last decade reduced the gap be-
tween men and women in relation to DB pension coverage (Pensions
Commission 2004: 98). With reference to all forms of occupational pen-
sions, coverage among full-time women is now higher than among full-
time men, and even among part-time women workers, for whom coverage
has lagged behind, the trend is upwards (Pensions Commission 2004: 98).
If these developments continue, we will see a gradual reduction in the
gendered division of post-retirement income and it will become increas-
ingly common for the woman’s pension to contribute most to a couple’s
joint retirement income. Referring again to the exemplar biographies, this
would be the case, for example, if the more fortunate women such as NHS
Margaret were married to those of our men without access to occupational
provision, for example car-component ﬁrm employee Tony (Table 3).
Seeing individuals in couples also reveals the signiﬁcance of marriage
for retirement income. For a person who has restricted access to occu-
pational pensions, the consequences might be reduced if she or he had a
partner with a good occupational pension. This can be illustrated by both
Tessa, the unqualiﬁed worker and carer, and Tony, the unqualiﬁed male
worker. As was seen, their pensions varied considerably depending on
their employers. If they were married to each other, the consequences of
this variability would be felt by both of them. Let us consider in particular
Tessa the corner-shop employee: she has an individual pension that
T A B L E 3. Total occupational pension as a percentage of the social inclusion
threshold in 2050, rank order of exemplar the male and female biographies with
diﬀerent employers
Rank Identiﬁer Employers Pension type
% of SI
threshold1
1 Tony Rover/Vauxhall DB 154
2 Margaret National Health Service (NHS) DB 95
3 Tessa Tesco DB 80
4 Tony Nissan/Peugeot DC 78
5 Tessa Boots DC 68
6 Margaret NHS and small private-sector employer DB (20 years) 58
7 Tony Car-component supplier None 57
8 Tessa Corner-shop None 47
9 Gordon Construction and self-employed DC (14 years) 39
10 David Self-employed None 27
Notes : DB deﬁned beneﬁt. DC deﬁned contribution. 1. Value of total pension as a percentage of social
inclusion threshold.
368 Traute Meyer and Paul Bridgen
amounts to 47 per cent of the social inclusion threshold. How would her
situation in relation to social inclusion change if she were to marry? The
answer depends on the occupational pension access of her partner. If she
married Tony the component-ﬁrm employee, who has no occupational
pension, she remains signiﬁcantly disadvantaged. Together they have a
joint income which is only 69 per cent of the household social inclusion
threshold.9 If, however, she married Tony the Ford/Vauxhall employee
with two DB pensions, the total pension income of the couple would be 33
per cent above the household social inclusion threshold.
The consequences of non-professional access to occupational
pensions
The occupational pension retrenchment
It is clear therefore that the social division of occupational pensions in the
current UK system is far from straightforward. Among individuals on
below-average wages, those with identical working-life biographies in
terms of pay, part- or full-time working and labour market detachment,
can receive very diﬀerent retirement incomes solely on the basis of their
particular employers. These diﬀerences are possible even between those
with the same occupation. As has been seen, this situation has received less
attention in the social division of welfare literature than diﬀerences by
social class and gender, with the result that the role of the occupational
sector in protecting not just core workers, but also more marginal in-
dividuals, has not been suﬃciently considered.
If the positive features of UK occupational provision have been un-
derstated, their more explicit identiﬁcation raises important concerns in
relation to: (i) recent developments in the occupational sphere; and (ii) the
determinants of the distribution of pension income among those on
average to low incomes. Let us ﬁrst consider recent developments in
occupational provision. As is well known, a major shift has been taking
place from DB to DC pensions (Bridgen and Meyer 2005a). Indeed,
according to a recent survey of the pension arrangements oﬀered by 186 of
all FTSE10 350 companies, the end of DB schemes in large private-sector
companies is well underway (Towers Perrin 2004; The Financial Times, 28
June 2004; Confederation of British Industry (CBI)/Mercer 2004: 10).
Since 1995, employers across the board have closed their schemes to new
members, with high street banks, insurers and retail operators setting the
trend, and the pace accelerating after 2000 (IDS 2002: 19, 32 and 37;
Pensions Commission 2004: 114). After a fairly stable period during the
early 1990s, in 1996 11 per cent, and in 1997 13 per cent, of all DB schemes
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of larger employers (>20 employees) were closed to new members
(Department of Social Security (DSS) 1998: 47). Between 1998 and 2000,
one-tenth of very large employers (>1000 employees) had closed their
schemes to new members (DWP 2002: 53), and between 2000 and 2003 a
further one-third did the same (DWP 2004: 61: IDS 2004). As a conse-
quence of these closures, the coverage of the workforce in companies with
more than 20 workers by salary-related schemes declined from 60 to 50
per cent between 1996 and 1998 (DWP 2002: 50), and from 48 per cent to
41 per cent between 2000 and 2003 (DWP 2004: 56, 61). Coverage today
is still high because the trend only aﬀects a company’s new employees.
A generational change has therefore been underway in many large
private-sector companies. So far, public-sector schemes have remained
unaﬀected by closures, and continue to provide good beneﬁts, but even
here important changes to the beneﬁt structure are being considered (The
Financial Times, 21 May 2004).
The results of the simulated biographies emphasise the problems that
these developments will cause for those with below-average lifetime
incomes. This is because DC pensions, while providing a substantial sup-
plement to state provision and having some advantages over DB schemes,
particularly in relation to job mobility (Blake 2000), are less generous,
mainly because while the average employer contribution to DB schemes is
15.7 per cent (IDS 2004: 184), it is only ﬁve per cent to DC schemes (IDS
2003; see also Pensions Commission 2004: 88–9). DC schemes also
generally mean an increase in individual uncertainty and risk (Ring 2002:
559–61). With the social role of employers declining, more of the below-
average wages group will be at risk of social exclusion or even poverty
in retirement (see also Pensions Commission 2004: 96). Our analysis has
highlighted the dangers of these developments for a signiﬁcant group of
non-core workers, many of whom are women. Any substantial retrench-
ment in the public sector would leave women much more vulnerable to
poverty or social exclusion in retirement, and may reverse the gains in
employment equity that they have made in recent years.
Chance and the distribution of occupational pensions
A focus on the variable access of non-professionals to occupational pro-
vision also emphasises the role of chance in the distribution of these types
of pension. To be clear, chance does not fully explain the distribution of
occupational pensions, and class and gender remain very important
predictors of occupational pension access. Among the less advantaged
social groups, however, we argue that chance provides the best way of
understanding why some workers have access to an occupational pension
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while others with similar or the same working-life biographies (in terms of
wages, occupation and employment sector) do not. In this regard, we use
the term ‘chance’ because some individuals ﬁnd themselves with em-
ployers who provide good occupational schemes more by accident than
design. Whether an individual has a good pension income is the result of
an employment decision made for reasons unrelated to savings or pensions
criteria.
Our emphasis on the role of chance is on two grounds. First, we argue
that there is a general lack of knowledge about occupational pensions,
which is particularly acute amongst those on low to middle incomes; this
impedes informed choice and increases the inﬂuence of chance. Secondly,
structural constraints on job availability, particularly for low- to middle-
income workers, limits people’s ability to choose their employer and
thus the scope for basing employment decisions on occupational pro-
vision. Individual ignorance is generally not recognised in the economics
of pensions’ literature, even that element concerned with explaining
individuals’ pension-related decisions.
Rather, individuals are customarily conceived as rational actors in their
approach to pension savings, who seek intentionally to determine their
consumption within and across time periods to maximise lifetime utility
(e.g. Gustman, Mitchell and Steinmeier 1994). They are assumed to save
during working periods to ensure they have suﬃcient income when not
working. As Rowlingson (2002) suggested, this presumption has been
shared by many recent UK social and pensions’ policy makers. Under the
Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s, and under New Labour
since 1997, responsible individuals who anticipate risks and take appro-
priate prudent actions have been lauded. ‘[G]overnment cannot solve
problems alone’, suggested New Labour in 1999, but needs ‘ to work with
people to encourage them to help themselves ’ (DSS 1999, cited in
Rowlingson 2002: 624). One way individuals might do this is by assessing
the respective merits of employers on the basis of whether they provide an
occupational pension.
A well-established critique of the rational actor model is that constraints
of time, imperfect knowledge and imperfect ability bound rationality
and thus the ability to choose. This is particularly the case with pensions,
for which the complexity of products and instruments make it diﬃcult
for individuals to estimate risk and value (Burchardt 1997). The levels of
knowledge and understanding are generally low, with respect to both
personal and occupational provision (Goode Committee 1994; Mayhew
2001; Thomas, Pettigrew and Tovey 1999; Rowlingson 2002). These
information problems have been made worse by the well-known scandals
in the occupational- and personal-pensions ﬁelds, which have at the very
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least raised doubts about the ‘rationality ’ of relying on employers or the
ﬁnancial sector (Waine 1995). As Taylor Gooby (1999) noted, these prob-
lems are not experienced equally by all social groups and are most
prevalent among those on lower incomes.
Yet it is precisely this group that most needs knowledge of occupational
pension provision, given that their access is much less certain on the basis
of their employment. In its absence, the nature of pension provision sup-
plied by a potential employer is unlikely to exert any major inﬂuence over
the employment decisions of workers. This is certainly the conclusion
reached by studies of employees’ knowledge of and attitudes concerning
occupational pensions, which suggest that occupational welfare plays little
part in attracting workers to employers (Cable and Graham 2000; Turban
and Cable 2003), and that most employees who work in companies with
occupational provision have very little knowledge of their pension ar-
rangements (Loretto, White and Duncan 2001; Vickerstaﬀ, Cox and Keen
2003).
In addition to the imperfect knowledge of pension schemes, the idea
that chance determines access to occupational pension provision among
low to middle income workers is reinforced by the structural constraints
that aﬀect job choice. Even if individuals acted ‘rationally ’ and sought
occupations and employers that provide good occupational pensions, it is
clear that the extent to which they have a choice of employer is aﬀected by
general economic conditions and job supply. In a tight labour market with
many advertised vacancies, an individual might be able to choose between
employers, but in times of above-average unemployment, workers have
few choices, especially in less prosperous regions. We know that jobs,
particularly in the private sector, are not dispersed evenly around the
country and that there is a tendency for industries in the same sector to
agglomerate in particular areas (Bennett, Graham and Bratton 1999;
Henderson and Hoggart 2003; Coombes and Raybould 2004).
One consequence is that the supply of jobs and individual job choices is
greater in some areas than others. We also know that variations in job
availability are more pronounced at the local level (Sunley 2000: 490–1).
Those areas with a signiﬁcant manufacturing sector, for example, other
things being equal, will have more jobs that oﬀer occupational pensions
opportunities than areas without. Given that most workers seek jobs that
do not require them to move, the choice of possible employers will be
constrained, and the chances of there being a good supply of employers
providing occupational pensions vary by area. In summary, there are good
reasons to conclude that the circumstances which lead a middle-income
worker to ﬁnd himself or herself with an employer that provides a good-
quality occupational pension have very little to do with intention, but
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rather, are mainly a product of chance – accidents of timing, opportunities
and location.
Occupational provision and pensions’ reform
So far this paper has shown that the incomplete level of coverage of
occupational pension provision in the UK creates inequalities in pension
outcome not just between class and gender groups but also within them.
It has demonstrated the important role that occupational provision has
played and continues to play in boosting the retirement income of those at
relatively high risk of retirement poverty. For a substantial minority of
non-core workers, occupational pensions successfully deliver old-age
welfare (DSS 1998). In this regard, the notion of ‘ two nations ’ in retire-
ment is misleading, if understood as implying a straightforward division on
the basis of class and/or gender. There are not clear-cut ‘haves ’ and
‘have-nots ’ among those with lower income, and higher income does not
necessarily produce increased pension wealth (Banks et al. 2005). Some
women with incomes below average will have higher pensions as a result
of good occupational provision and have better retirement income than
some men with higher earnings.
The role played by the private sector in protecting non-core workers in
this way has arguably received too little attention from critics of private-
sector pensions. There are nonetheless signiﬁcant policy implications from
the general shift in the industrialised world away from state provision and
towards private arrangements (Pedersen 2004). Some policy analysts have
argued that it is not so much private engagement per se which is at odds
with social inclusion for citizens at risk ; rather, much depends on the type
of private-sector involvement and the nature of the continuing relation-
ship between state and non-state providers (Bridgen and Meyer 2007;
Hyde, Dixon and Drover 2003; Stevens, Gieselink and Van Buggenhout
2002). Non-state provision that involves employers organising and sup-
porting risk-pooling in an eﬀective way, and including citizens on mod-
erate incomes, sometimes as a result of government regulation, can be an
eﬀective welfare tool. The extent to which this is so depends to a large
degree on the continuing role of the state.
This dimension underlies the biggest problems of the British pensions
system. The low level of state provision means that access to an occu-
pational scheme is of considerable importance, but because provision of
occupational pensions is voluntary, access to these schemes is found
almost exclusively in large companies or in the public sector. While large
employers have a strong self-interest to invest in company pension
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schemes, not least to attract and retain higher-skilled workers, and so to
provide good beneﬁts, the same motivation cannot be expected from small
businesses with fewer resources (Mares 2001; Hannah 1986; Sasss 1997).
As a result, the pension income of low- and middle-income employees is
more often the product of chance – with access to occupational provision
an accidental by-product of an employment decision made for non-
pension related reasons.
This situation is diﬃcult to justify on the basis of the norms normally
deployed by mainstream policy-makers to defend the current pension-
income distribution.11 They have emphasised ‘desert ’ as a distributive
principle, which is founded either on an expectation of ‘responsible ’ be-
haviour among citizens or on merit, i.e. talent plus eﬀort. Because in-
dividuals do not behave according to the rational actor model, however,
any notion that they ‘deserve ’ the pension outcome they receive is weak-
ened. Merit-based arguments are equally problematic. In this regard, both
the Conservative and Labour parties have generally been prepared to
accept that the skewed distribution of occupational pensions in favour of
the middle classes, like high levels of executive pay, can be defended as a
consequence of ‘ talent and hard work’. ‘The pension system should re-
ward work’, New Labour stated in 1998 (DSS 1998). There are of course
many problems with this argument (see Plant 1991 ; Swift and Marshall
1997 ; Saunders 1996), but it is particularly weak when considered in the
context of the distributive issues that we have discussed. Anyone could ﬁnd
themselves with an employer that provides no occupational pension, and
therefore having to pay signiﬁcantly more in social insurance contri-
butions and savings for the same pension as a luckier person. This situation
is much more likely to occur amongst individuals with below-average in-
comes, as exempliﬁed by the imagined biographies, because of the more
patchy coverage of occupational pensions for this group. Even on the basis
of the meritocratic principles advocated by today’s policy-makers, it can-
not be considered as just.
For these and other reasons, several countries are exploring a diﬀerent
approach to the role of pensions in occupational and retirement welfare
(Whiteford and Whitehouse 2006). In the comparator countries, for ex-
ample, poverty risks are lower because some coercion over providers of
occupational welfare is exercised in order to facilitate wide access to
schemes and a minimum pension level. Such constraints are imposed by
the state in Switzerland and by collective agreements backed by the state
in The Netherlands. The avoidance of poverty in retirement is left far less
to chance. Perversely, however, countries such as Germany and Italy that
have recently reformed their pension systems appear to be taking the UK
path rather than that set by Switzerland and The Netherlands (Meyer et al.
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2007). Ironically, the agenda in the UK is to move in the other direction.
On the basis of a broad consensus among pensions policy interests that has
developed over the last few years, and in response to the ﬁnal report of the
government-appointed Pensions Commission (2005), New Labour has
recently committed itself to a signiﬁcant reform of the UK pensions sys-
tem. This will involve the phased improvement of the basic state pension12
and the establishment in 2012 of ‘Personal Accounts ’ for those not already
covered by occupational provision (DWP 2006). The latter would auto-
matically enrol relevant workers, but given continued sensitivities in the
UK about compulsion, would allow individuals the option of contracting
out. If employees chose not to contract out, they would contribute four per
cent of earnings between upper and lower thresholds13 with employers
compelled to add another three per cent. A further one per cent of earn-
ings would be generated from the tax relief available on pension con-
tributions.
If passed, these proposals would go some way to mitigating the prob-
lems with the current system for future cohorts of workers that this
paper has outlined (see also Bridgen and Meyer 2005b). They would, for
example, almost certainly reduce the variability in pension outcomes
between employees in the same sector, thus reducing the role of chance in
determining pension outcomes. This can be illustrated by looking again
at the risk biographies, particularly those of the least well protected
individuals – corner-shop Tessa and component-worker Tony – who
because they do not currently have occupational provision have most to
gain in terms of retirement income from the introduction of the Personal
Accounts (Table 4).14
For Tessa, having a Personal Account when employed would mean that
she would receive a pension that is 15 percentage points higher in relation
to the social exclusion threshold than under the current system, and her
retirement income at 65 years-of-age would be signiﬁcantly closer to that
T A B L E 4. The eﬀect of Personal Accounts on projected pension income in 2050,
the exemplar biographies of Tessa and Tony
Tessa Tony
Employer and pension variants SI% Employer and pension variants SI%
Corner-shop, current system 47 Component ﬁrm, current system 57
Corner-shop, Personal Accounts 62 Component ﬁrm, Personal Accounts 75
Boots, DC 68 Nissan/Peugeot, DC 78
Tesco, DB 91 Ford/Vauxhall, DB 152
Notes : DB deﬁned beneﬁt. DC deﬁned contribution. SI% Total pension as percentage of social
inclusion threshold.
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received by someone with the same working life biography and a DC
pension than in the current system (Table 4).15 Similarly, component-
worker Tony would receive a pension that was 18 percentage points
above the social exclusion threshold than under the current system, which
would mean that his retirement income, when aged 65 years, would
also be signiﬁcantly closer to that of someone with the same working life
biography and access to a DC pension (Table 4). While Personal Accounts
might improve the lot of future cohorts of workers, there is a concern that
this will not necessarily be the case for current workers, who would pay
contributions for only a part of their working life (Pensions Policy Institute
2006). Moreover, if introduced, Personal Accounts will not accrue for
another six years (from 2007), and given the phased nature of the employer
contribution, it will be another three years before the full eight per cent
contribution is being paid. Moreover, even once the scheme is fully
operational, the evidence from the simulations is that signiﬁcant variations
will remain, especially between Personal Account workers and those en-
titled to a DB pension (Table 4). Pension income will still be closely related
to employer provision, and chance will still be a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
how this income is distributed.
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NOTES
1 Although, as Sinﬁeld suggested in 1978, they have perhaps received less attention than
their importance merits.
2 The research reported in this paper was part of an European Union Fifth Framework
R&D project Private Pensions and Social Inclusion in Europe that was undertaken between
January 2003 and October 2005. The investigators were : P. Bridgen and T. Meyer,
University of Southampton; B. Riedmu¨ller and M. Willert, Free University of Berlin ;
P. Calza Bini, M. Raitano and S. Turcio, Institute of Research on the Dynamics of
Social Security ; B. de Vroom and D. Bannink, University of Twente ; G. Bonoli
and F. Bertozzi ; University of Fribourg; M. Benio; Cracow University of Economics ;
and Joanna Ratajczak-Tuchołka, Poznan´ University of Economics.
3 The simulations for The Netherlands were undertaken by Duco Bannink and Bert
deVroom, and those for Switzerland by Fabio Bertozzi and Giuliano Bonoli. They
were calculated as part of the EU Fifth Framework project as described.
4 Although in the UK even this task is made more complicated by the contracting
out arrangements for the State Second Pension.
5 This does not mean however that there is no variation in the generosity of
occupational pensions in these countries.
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6 The need for reliable comparative data was an important consideration in deciding
on these thresholds. The lack of median incomes for all countries inﬂuenced the
selection of 40 per cent of the average income as the threshold for an individual’s
‘ social exclusion’, as determined from oﬃcial data (Eurostat 2003). There was
evidence that in some countries, 50 per cent of the average income was substantially
higher than the national relative poverty lines based on 60 per cent median income.
7 The UK National Insurance Fund, established in the late 1940s, is equivalent to the
Social Security Fund in many other countries. It is notionally distinct from general
national accounts, but that is a ﬁction. Its accounts are not separately published,
and the funding of social security, including old-age state pensions, is in practice on a
current account pay-as-you-go basis. The claims are both sacrosanct and can and are
negotiated, as with the annual increase of pension payments, but the responsibility for
their funding is accepted as a general charge on public funds.
8 Both Peugeot’s and Nissan’s DC schemes require variable rates of contribution by
the member, with the employer’s contribution being determined by the employee’s.
In the Peugeot scheme, for example, the employer matches the employee’s con-
tributions up to three per cent of gross income, and then matches and adds an extra
one per cent to contributions between four and ﬁve per cent. This contribution
structure is typical of DC schemes, and is reﬂected in the facts that the average
contribution levels for DC schemes are 3.4 per cent for employees and ﬁve per cent
for employers (IDS 2003). We have used these averages in the simulations.
9 The couple’s social inclusion threshold is 1.5 times that of the individual’s.
10 Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) or ‘ footsie ’ index companies.
11 Some academic commentators have argued, from Rawls’s (1973) principles, that any
pension system that like that of the UK which makes voluntary occupational and/or
personal provision a central component cannot be just because it does not guarantee
to meet basic needs (e.g. Schokkaert and Van Parijs 2003).
12 This would involve linking its rise to wages rather than prices from 2012 at the earliest.
This is to be accompanied by a phased increase in the pension age. See DWP (2006).
13 The lower threshold is proposed to be set at £5,000 with the higher threshold at
£33,000.
14 Their disposable income during working life would obviously decline, assuming they
stayed enrolled.
15 To enable the comparison, we have not included the eﬀect of the retirement age
proposals in these calculations.
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